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1.Introduction 
 
Yeltsin proclaims at a campaign rally, “Elect me and you'll get a brand-new president.” 
“What if we don't elect you, Boris Nikolaevich?” asks a voice from the crowd. 
“Then you'll get the same old president,” Yeltsin replies.2 
 
In March 2004, a presidential election is expected to be hold in Russia, but—in contrast to the 
same event four years ago—the European non-specialised media and public have paid little 
attention to it. The difference between both campaigns does not lie in the probabilities about 
their outcome: having been appointed by Yeltsin as his semi-official successor, Putin was 
certain to become president in 2000, as he is now to continue for a second term. What 
happened then is that the Kremlin’s candidate was a complete stranger for everyone, from the 
Western analysts to the Russians themselves; discussion went on for a long time, trying to 
solve the now topical question of “Who is Mr. Putin?”.  
That all came to an end with 9/11. Russia’s support to the U.S. war in Afghanistan was 
seen as a litmus test of Putin’s intentions, and the “Pro-Western Reformer” paradigm 
triumphantly emerged among the contending explanations of the president’s aims. However, 
that was not supported by facts from his former career or, more importantly, the rest of policy 
measures he had been implementing before September 2001. War in Iraq has finally 
demonstrated that Putin’s choice to support the United States was not irreversible.  
                                                          
1 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan 
necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These 
articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI 
2 A popular joke during the 1996 presidential campaign, quoted by Belin, Laura: “Humor of the Political 
Opposition: Then and Now”, RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly, Vol. 2, No. 36, 30 October 2002, in 
http://www.rferl.org. 
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The explanation for such a misinterpretation could be found in the analysts’ failure to 
rely on facts, rather than on official declarations and foreign commentators. As Bennet has 
wisely pointed out,  
Putin’s pre-electoral book-interview,3 long, authorized leaks in the media and a film autobiography 
“Muzhskaya Rabota” were occasionally quoted but not analysed. Western journalists and 
commentators preferred to rely on anti-Putin, erudite chattering classes in Moscow and St 
Petersburg and unattributed translations from the Russian press. Their Russian counterparts 
prematurely switched on their old Soviet auto-censorship mechanism, avoiding profiling Putin in 
depth. A better look at Putin at this stage would have shown that his background and his early 
working years could have been a serious drawback in his political career had they been scrutinized 
earlier [...]4 
Today, we have not solved yet the enigma that Putin presented in March 2000. In 
addition to the optimistic, “post-9/11” interpretation, some have warned of a more conflicting 
foreign policy based on his goal of restoring Russia’s position as a “great power”. Others have 
stressed that he owes his job to Yeltsin, which should restrict his ability to implement changes 
that could affect the privileges of the so-called “Family”5; while many have perceived a return 
to authoritarian methods, based on the slogans “vertical of power” and “dictatorship of law”.  
This research,6 whose results are presented in two separate articles, tries to offer a wider 
and more accurate view of Putin’s role as Russian President, supported by direct evidence. Part 
One, which is published here,7 is focused on his biographical antecedents: the first section 
deals with his official biographies and their failures; section two presents a detailed analysis of 
his career in the KGB; section three deals with the start of his political career beside Anatoli 
Sobchak, and the influence that the mayor of St. Petersburg may have had on him.  
Part Two—in the next issue of this journal—will begin with a study of Putin’s later 
career in Moscow, until he became prime minister. Then, we will examine his political project, 
as stated during his campaign and on his public appearances; and finally, discuss the main 
interpretations of his role that have appeared in the scholarly literature. Our conclusions want 
to contribute to the debate about the next, and probably also Putin’s term of presidency, 
addressing the persistent question of “Who Rules Russia Today?”   
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The book mentioned is Gevorkian, Natalia; Timakova, Natalia and Kolesnikov, Andrei (2000): Ot piervogo 
litsá: razgovori s Vladimirom Putinim [In the First Person: Talks with Vladimir Putin]. Moscow, Vagrius. We 
will refer to it later in this article.  
4 Bennet, Gordon (2002): Vladimir Putin and Russia’s Special Services, in http://www.csrc.ac.uk.  
5 Designation for the group of Yeltsin’s advisors, aides, and relatives—as his daughter, Tatiana Diachenko,—that 
greatly influenced political decisions during his presidency.  
6 The author—who is currently writing his Ph.D. thesis Russia’s Security Policy: Internal Factors and 
International Relations, 1998-2004—thanks the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI), Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, for awarding him a grant towards a stay in Moscow in August 2003, during which the Russian 
materials for this study were obtained.   
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7 The second part, “Who Rules Russia Today? An Analysis of Vladimir Putin and His Political Project (II)”, will 
be published in the next issue of UNISCI Discussion Papers.  
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2.Official biographies 
In fact, I have a very simple life [...]8 
The first source that may be approached for trying to analyse Putin’s project is, of course, his 
career, from which significant evidence could be obtained about how his ideology and 
personality were shaped. Therefore, as many Western scholars have done since he became 
Yeltsin’s successor, we should refer in the first place to his widely known official biographies.  
However, that kind of information must be carefully contrasted before reaching any 
conclusion, distinguishing facts from mere political propaganda. In Russia, since the 2000 
electoral campaign, the president has been presented by the state-controlled media as a young, 
energetic, and reliable official (in contrast to Yeltsin’s chaotic style of leadership), and his life 
story been used to reinforce that image in the public. Such a phenomenon, which has gradually 
become a real “Putinmania”, reminds us of the Soviet “cult to personality” and, perhaps, 
Yeltsin’s popularity in 1990-1991.  
That is why we consider these biographies to be not only insufficient to assess Putin’s 
performance before becoming Russian president, but also plainly biased when they omit 
potentially embarrassing facts as, for example, his career in the KGB. All that we learn about 
his fifteen years in the organi 9, one third of them in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), 
is his role in the foreign intelligence, with no details about his actual duties or his possible 
relation to other KGB activities.10 Therefore, trying to stick to the official data could 
negatively affect the objectivity of our conclusions.  
This becomes evident by examining the very few lines, mainly an enumeration of his 
political posts since 1990, in which these biographies can be summarized:11  
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was born in Leningrad (now St Petersburg) on 7 October 
1952. He obtained a degree in Law at Leningrad State University in 1975 (later, he became 
Candidate to Doctor in Economic Sciences). After graduating, he was selected by the KGB, 
where he worked from 1975 to 1990 as a foreign intelligence officer. From 1985 to 1990 he 
served in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).  
In 1990 he returned to Leningrad and became assistant for international affairs to the 
President 12 of Leningrad State University. Later, he was appointed advisor to the Chairman 
of the Leningrad City Council. In June 1991, he was promoted to Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee of the Leningrad City Council. After the collapse of the USSR, from 1994 
he also served as first deputy mayor of St Petersburg.  
                                                          
8 Vladimir Putin, in Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 5 (translated by Javier Morales).  
9 “Organs” (of the State Security). A common Russian designation for the KGB.  
10 See: Morales Hernández, Javier: “Los Servicios de Seguridad e Inteligencia en la Rusia de Putin” [Security and 
Intelligence Services in Putin’s Russia], UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 2 (May 2003), in 
http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci, pp. 2-3.  
11 Our sources here are the Russian Presidency’s website and the Ministry of Defence’s Military Encyclopaedic 
Dictionary. Substantial data in other official biographies are almost identical to these examples. See: Biografiya / 
Biography [Russian and English versions], in http://www.president.kremlin.ru; Ministerstvo Oborony Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii, Institut Voyennoy Istorii (2002): “Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich”, in Voyenniy Entsiklopedicheskiy 
Slovar [Military Encyclopaedic Dictionary]. Moscow, Bolshaya Rossiyskaya Entsiklopediya / Ripol Klassik.  
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In August 1996, he moved to Moscow as deputy head of President Yeltsin’s 
Secretariat.13 From March 1997, he worked as deputy head of the Presidential Administration, 
head of the President’s Main Control Directorate.14 In May 1998 he was appointed first 
deputy head of the Presidential Administration. Two months later, he became Director of the 
Federal Security Service (FSB). From March 1999, he also served as Secretary of the Security 
Council.  
In August 1999, he was appointed first Vice-President, and then President of the 
Government.15 On 31 December 1999, after Yeltsin’s resignation, he became acting President. 
He was elected President of the Russian Federation on 26 March 2000; inaugurated on 7 May 
2000.  
There are, as we have said, many missing points in this story. First, we find three out of 
four paragraphs devoted to Putin’s career since 1990, while his fifteen years in the KGB are 
described in only two sentences. Furthermore, no explanation is given for the KGB’s interest 
in recruiting him, nor for his reason for leaving the organization for an uncertain political 
career when he was still in his thirties. We will address each of these points in the following 
section.  
3.The Missing Years: KGB, 1975-1990 
All decent people have started [their career] in the intelligence. Me, too.16 
Where Putin has most extensively talk about his past in the organi is a series of six interviews 
published in the form of a book in 2000,17 just before the election in which he became 
president. There he made an unusually personal account of his own life, talking to the 
journalists in a relaxed, “without jacket” environment.18 In this fashion, he may have 
consciously tried to distance himself from his image as Yeltsin’s “grey cardinal” in the eyes of 
Russian voters. This suspicion is increased after knowing that, despite the detailed picture that 
the book presents and the sometimes embarrassing nature of the questions, the Kremlin has 
recently included its full text in their official website.19 
The first conclusion we can draw out is that it was not ideology, but more likely idealism 
or romanticism, what first convinced Putin of applying for the KGB. As a schoolboy, he even 
went to its Leningrad headquarters to inform himself of the requirements for joining the 
organization;20 so it all started as a teenager’s, not an indoctrinated communist’s decision. For 
Putin’s generation, already raised in the Khrushchov era, the KGB (with a little help from 
                                                          
13 We have preferred to translate certain designations from the Kremlin’s website in Russian, instead of taking 
them as they appear in its English version. See Biografiya / Biography, op. cit.   
14 See the previous footnote.  
15 Official designation for the Russian prime minister.   
16 Henry Kissinger, former U.S. National Security Advisor, in a conversation with Putin (who was already 
working at the St. Petersburg City Council), after knowing that he had served in the Soviet foreign intelligence. 
Quoted by Putin in Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 73 (translated by Javier Morales).  
17 Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit. Other books, as the one by the journalist Leonid Mlechin, are 
also based on that source for their chapters about Putin. See Mlechin, Leonid M. (2002): Kreml. Prezidenti 
Rossii: Strategia Vlasti ot B. N. Yeltsina do V. V. Putina [Kremlin. Presidents of Russia: Power’s Strategy from 
B. N. Yeltsin to V. V. Putin]. Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf.  
18 Ibid., p. 3.  
19 See: Kniga “Ot piervogo litsá...” [Book “In the First Person...”], in http://www.president.kremlin.ru. 
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propaganda) could be identified with adventures against foreign enemies, rather than with 
internal repression and mass executions. Those were the years of “de-Stalinization”, and, as 
Bennet explains,21 there were few dreams available for a Soviet boy as exciting as that of 
becoming razvedchik, spy. In a society that glorified intelligence officers together with 
cosmonauts, scientists, sportsmen and other state heroes, and considering Putin’s age at the 
time when he made up his mind, this cannot be interpreted as an ideologically motivated 
decision; it is more likely that he simply became interested by watching films as Podvig 
Razvedchika [The Spy’s Exploit], his favourite one.22 Putin himself acknowledges that “my 
notions about the KGB were based on romantic stories about the spies’ work”.23  
However, even if it was not a mature decision, Putin really had a true and clearly defined 
vocation. The best evidence for this is that he carefully planned how to be accepted in the 
KGB: his brief interview with an official at the Leningrad headquarters made a deep 
impression on him, that had two important consequences for his immediate plans. First, being 
told that he needed a university degree before joining the organi, and that the most appropriate 
was Law, he chose to enter that faculty. Secondly, as the other reason for not accepting him 
then (apart, of course, from his age) was that, in the officer’s words, “we do not take people on 
their own initiative,”24 he consciously tried during all his university years to attract the KGB 
recruiters’ attention—and his strategy worked.25  
The second point of concern for us refers to his actual duties in the organi. As it is 
known, the KGB was in charge of a wide range of activities, from the repression of political 
dissidence to the protection of the state borders, intelligence collection in foreign countries or 
satellite imagery; and it is still not clear in which of them Putin was engaged during his fifteen 
years’ service.26 It is crucial for us to determine that, because the possibility of Putin’s 
participation in political repression could greatly undermine his democratic credibility. There 
are mainly two views on this issue.  
In Russia, Putin is predominantly believed to have only served in the KGB’s foreign 
intelligence directorate, as we have read in the first section of this article.27 On the other hand, 
some authors consider that he fulfilled counterintelligence duties: “Putin’s career pattern 
indicates that he must have been sent to one of the counterintelligence schools, most probably 
in Minsk, the KGB school which catered mainly for the employees of the Second Main 
Directorate [...].”28 So, according to this version, he did not belong to the KGB’s First Main 
Directorate (the foreign intelligence service), but to the Second, responsible for 
counterintelligence and internal security, which maintained the network of informers and also 
                                                          
21 Bennet, op. cit., p. 5.  
22 Ibid., p. 5.  
23 Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 39 (translated by Javier Morales).  
24 Ibid., p. 25 (translated by Javier Morales).  
25 When he was in his fourth year at the university, the KGB finally contacted Putin and offered him to join the 
organization after his graduation. See: Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 38,  
26 Although we briefly dealt with this issue in a previous article (in Spanish), here we will complement it with 
new sources and Putin’s own account and perceptions. See: Morales Hernández, op. cit., pp. 2-3; and specially 
Bennet, op. cit., pp. 5-6. General descriptions of the KGB history and structure are: Andrew, Christopher and 
Gordievsky, Oleg (1991): KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev. London, 
Hodder & Stoughton; Waller, J. Michael (1994): Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today. Boulder, Westview 
Press.  
27 Biografiya / Biography, op. cit.; Ministerstvo Oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii, op. cit.  
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fought organized crime and drug trafficking.29 All these areas were conducted in the territory 
of the USSR, so this would be a contradiction with Putin’s period of service in the GDR. 
However, Bennet argues, in that period he may have worked in the First Main Directorate’s 
counterintelligence department based in Eastern Germany, or perhaps acted as a liaison officer 
with the local security services.30  
Putin has partially answered to this questions in the book Ot piervogo litsa, where he 
tells that after joining the KGB he was assigned to its Leningrad local directorate. His first task 
was an administrative one, at the directorate’s secretariat, and then at its counterintelligence 
unit: 31 an uninteresting, bureaucratic work, he says. However, probably because Putin’s 
superiors carefully studied his psychological profile, after only five months he started an 
intensive retraining course for “operational staff”32 in Leningrad, which lasted for half a year.  
His performance seemed to attract the attention of the foreign intelligence directorate, 
who contacted him when he returned to his former office. Working as a “spy” was all Putin 
had desired from his childhood; entering the First Directorate was also a promotion, for its 
members were regarded as “white collars” inside the organization (in part because they could 
travel and live in the West, an inaccessible privilege for most Soviet citizens). So he accepted, 
and—at the end of the 70’s, with the rank of major—he went to Moscow for another special 
course, where he spent a year.33 
During the following months, Putin worked again in Leningrad, but now at the so-called 
First Section (Piervy Otdel), a subdivision of the First Main Directorate with offices in the 
main cities of the Soviet Union.34 There he worked for four years and a half, and then returned 
to Moscow for attending the Red Flag Institute “Yuri V. Andropov”.35 Due to his knowledge 
of German, he was trained to work either in Western or Eastern Germany; but before going to 
the West, it was required to spent some years at the Directorate’s headquarters. So, wanting to 
start soon, he chose the GDR.36  
In Dresden, his only foreign destination, he and his family lived for five years. Being a 
socialist country, the KGB acted openly in the GDR, which for their purposes could be 
considered a “province” of the Soviet Union.37 According to Putin’s own account, he worked 
in a “political intelligence line”, which recruited informers and collected data about public 
                                                          
29 Waller, op. cit., p. 15.  
30 Bennet, op. cit., p. 6.  
31 Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 42.  
32 Ibid., p. 43.  
33 Ibid., p. 47.  
34 According to the CIDOB Foundation’s biography, that “First Section” had nothing to do with the First Main 
Directorate, and is described as a recruiting office. However, what Putin says is precisely the opposite: “After 
that, I returned again to Leningrad, [and] continued working there [...] in the First Section. The First Main 
Directorate was the espionage. That directorate had offices in the big cities of the [Soviet] Union, Leningrad 
included. There I continued working [...]” See Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 47 (translated 
by Javier Morales); and Fundació CIDOB (2001): Biografías de líderes políticos CIDOB: Vladimir Putin 
[CIDOB Political Leaders’ Biographies: Vladimir Putin], in http://www.cidob.org. 
35 The Institute was the training centre of the KGB’s First Main Directorate. Now, it is the Foreign Intelligence 
Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki, SVR) Academy.  
36 Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 50.  
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37 The collaboration between the KGB and their German counterparts was so close that even Putin and his family 
lived in a building which belonged to the local State Security Service (Staats Sicherheitsdienst or “Stasi”). See 
Liudmila Putina’s declarations in Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 62.  
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officers and the activities of potential opponents—the most important of which were, of 
course, NATO countries. Their areas of interest included Western political parties, leaders and 
tendencies inside them, the government—especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—, their 
policies and relations to other countries, and so on.38 Nonetheless, they apparently did not 
travel to the other side of the iron curtain; at least, Putin says that he never went to Western 
Germany in that period.39  
Nonetheless, some dark points continue to be present in this story. Although it is very 
clear that Putin was transferred to the First Main Directorate from his former position, what 
was exactly that position? The Leningrad local KGB directorate seems to have been divided 
into several sections: the First, for example, was dependent to the First Main Directorate. So, 
in which section did Putin work at first? In the counterintelligence unit, which was probably 
also subordinate to the Second Main Directorate.40 Here lies the problem: even if the Second 
did not work on political repression itself—which at that time was the Fifth Directorate’s 
job,41—the network of informers that it controlled was certainly used to detect and monitor 
dissidents. Putin may have not taken part in that, and worked only against foreign agents; but 
both functions were exercised by the same department. What is more: some suggest that his 
knowledge of foreign languages were not enough at that time to perform counterintelligence 
tasks, so he was more likely to be in charge of monitoring Soviet citizens.  
From this point of view, we can understand as well why—according to Putin’s words—
he was not apparently sent to any KGB academy after entering the organization, which is very 
improbable. He may want to keep secret the basic training he received, because it could be 
directly related to politically compromising functions.42 This explains why he gave so little 
information about his first tasks as a KGB agent in the pre-electoral interviews we have 
referred to, and leaves open the question about his participation in a less “heroic” area than 
foreign intelligence.  
When he is asked about the KGB’s role as a political police, Putin says that he “did not 
think [about repression] at all”, and even “did not know” about it. He argues that, when he 
entered the organization, he was still leaded by that romantic feeling from his youth about the 
spy’s job, mixed with the patriotic indoctrination that every Soviet citizen had went through.43 
However, although this explanation could be enough for his early vocation, it is not credible 
that in the years that followed he did not pay any attention to the moral problem which was 
implied. That is, even if he only fulfilled counterintelligence and then foreign intelligence 
tasks, he was part of a wider organization directly responsible for the worst crimes in Soviet 
                                                          
38 Putin denies that he worked on technical intelligence collection, for which another “line” was responsible. See: 
Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 66; Fundació CIDOB, op. cit. 
39 Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 62.  
40 Which, as we have said, was responsible for counterintelligence and internal security.  
41 See Waller, op. cit., p. 15.  
42 If the Second Directorate was his initial destination, he should have attended a course in a Counterintelligence 
School, probably in Minsk. See Bennet, op. cit., pp. 5-6.  
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history.44 What answer, if any, did he find? As Mlechin reminds, “he did not know what he did 
not want to know [...]”45 
4.From Intelligence to Politics: St. Petersburg, 1990-1996 
I had already understood that that system [the USSR] had no future.46 
The end for Putin’s career as an intelligence officer started with the fall of Berlin Wall: 
he feared that the Communist regime could also collapse in his country, and “sitting inside the 
system and waiting for its dissolution... It is very hard.”47 In 1990, when he returned to the 
Soviet Union, he arrived to a country that had changed, and where “serving in the KGB no 
longer caused envy”.48 So he asked to be transferred to the KGB’s active reserve, and decided 
to seek new opportunities outside the organi: he started writing a dissertation for the degree of 
Candidate to Doctor (kandidat nauk) at Leningrad State University (LGU), while at the same 
time was looking for a job there. He succeeded very soon, becoming assistant for International 
Affairs to the President of LGU.49  
There, always by his own account, he met some old friends from the Faculty of Law that 
had became professors, and one of them offered him to join the team of Anatoli Sobchak—a 
lawyer who had previously taught at LGU, and had recently been appointed mayor of 
Leningrad.50 Although Putin did not know him personally, apart from the courses he attended 
as a student, it seems that one of Sobchak’s former colleagues thought that Putin’s experience 
could be useful in the City Council.51  
Sobchak was Putin’s initiator in politics, so he probably had an important influence on 
the Russian president.52 He was an example of how many clever Party members decided to 
support perestroika, and later democracy, when the USSR was living its last moments: in 
1990—ironically, only two years after having joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU),—Sobchak already declared that “Marxism is condemned by History, the future of 
Communism in Russia is announced; the Communist Party is disappearing from the political 
scene.”53 As one of the most active members of the Congress of People’s Deputies, he took 
part in favour of Gorbachev against the most conservative sectors leaded by Yegor Ligachov: 
for example, accusing the latter of ordering the troops to fire against Georgian nationalist 
demonstrators in Tbilisi, 19 of which were killed.54 
                                                          
44 It is important to bear in mind that when he eagerly accepted the KGB’s offer, he still did not know in which 
directorate he would work. See Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 40.  
45 Mlechin, Leonid M. (2002): Kreml. Prezidenti Rossii: Strategia Vlasti ot B. N. Yeltsina do V. V. Putina 
[Kremlin. Presidents of Russia: Power’s Strategy from B. N. Yeltsin to V. V. Putin]. Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf, p. 
30.  
46 Vladimir Putin, in Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, p. 75.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Mlechin, op. cit., p. 46.  
49 Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 77. See also footnote 11.  
50 His official designation was then “chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet (Council)”.  
51 Putin’s service in the KGB should have been a serious disadvantage, because Sobchak was openly opposed to 
the power of the security organs. According to Putin’s account, although Sobchak reacted with suspicion when he 
knew about his former job, he accepted him because he urgently needed a personal assistant.  
52 Sobchak died in February 2000.  
53 In Novaya Gazeta, 16 June 1997; quoted by Poch-de-Feliu, Rafael (2003): La gran transición: Rusia, 1985-
2002 [The Great Transition: Russia, 1985-2002]. Barcelona, Crítica, p. 74.  
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Nonetheless, Sobchak realized that also Gorbachev’s days were coming to their end; 
from then on, his career would be linked to Yeltsin’s. In June 1991, he changed his old title—
“chairman of the Leningrad Soviet”—for that of a democratically elected mayor, by winning 
the local elections held together with those in which Yeltsin became president of the Russian 
republic.55 “We are witnessing the agony of the Communist regime”, he said three months 
later, in a press conference on the first night of the failed coup d’état.  
But, as Yeltsin himself and many of the politicians that joined his rise to power, his 
democratic credentials were not as true as it could be supposed. Despite their populist 
declarations, they did not hesitate to use authoritarian methods to achieve their aims; which is 
not surprising, taking into account that they had spent all their political career inside the Soviet 
system. What happened later was only a substitution of the Marxist-Leninist ideology for the 
“democratic” one as the official state doctrine, but according to a very particular definition of 
democracy. As the liberal Grigori Yavlinski denounced,  
in Russia a democrat is, in the first place, a person who supports an unlimited concentration of 
power in the hands of president Yeltsin. Secondly, a democrat is a person who [...] fights budget 
deficit. All other people who have a wider concept of democracy are not considered democrats.56 
It was clear soon that Sobchak did not accept other aspects of democracy, and in practise 
ruled in an authoritarian fashion because that permitted him to implement the planned reforms 
without contestation.57 Of course, freedom of speech was not very helpful to his projects, and 
the new mayor repeatedly showed his indignation at every criticism of him.58  After August 
1991, his powers were even reinforced by Yeltsin, by dissolving the Leningrad and Moscow 
local parliaments.59  
Putin’s new position beside Sobchak clearly came up to his expectations: a political 
career could be the job he had been looking for, so he resigned from the KGB’s reserve to 
concentrate himself on his new duties. Here we can see a further evidence of his accurate 
perception of the historical circumstances he was living in: success would no longer depend 
from serving in the state bureaucracy, in which the security organs or the CPSU were 
included, but from new sources of legitimacy that were introduced by perestroika and 
glasnost. Sobchak, as Gavriil Popov in Moscow and the “Democratic Russia” movement, 
contributed to the collapse of the USSR by supporting Yeltsin’s rise to power; and by doing 
so, they assured themselves and their collaborators—Putin among them—a place in the new 
political system.  
5.Conclusions 
The first conclusion after this brief summary of Putin’s career before arriving to Moscow is 
that his image has been constructed by the media: it is not easy to distinguish between what he 
really thought and did, and what he tells his audience when he speaks about his past. The fact 
that he allowed the journalists to ask him about his whole life for Ot piervogo litsa does not 
mean that he wanted to increase transparency between him and the Russians: being released 
just before the elections, the book could be considered a calculated work of public relations, 
for a presidential candidate that had only three months to become known to his voters. As we 
                                                          
55 Poch-de-Feliu, op. cit., pp. 214, 248-249.  
56 Quoted by Poch-de-Feliu, op. cit., p. 249.  
57 Poch-de-Feliu, op. cit., p. 248.  
58 Taibo, Carlos (2000): La explosión soviética [The Soviet explosion]. Madrid, Espasa Calpe, pp. 170, 309.  
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59 Poch-de-Feliu, op. cit., p. 249.  
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have seen, his answers are always well thought and balanced, not to contradict the impression 
he wants to create in the readers; and even potentially embarrassing points have been 
conveniently omitted.  
On the whole, Putin’s ability to adapt himself to the circumstances, while he continues 
sticking to his objectives, could be considered the key to understanding him. He is persistent in 
pursuing his goals, as he proved when he succeeded in being accepted by the KGB; he also 
makes plans for the long term, as when he chose his university degree or, twenty years later, 
decided to leave the Soviet intelligence. But his strength of will is combined with an ability to 
make a cold reasoning, and change the means he employs when the situation demands it. He 
was clever enough to realize that to survive to the collapse of the USSR he had to leave the 
KGB to serve the new political elites; and not only he was not affected by the dissolution of his 
former agency, but was successively promoted as the post-Soviet regime evolved.   
However, we do not find that Putin ever believed in democracy, neither as a KGB agent 
nor later in St. Petersburg. He does not seem to reject the role that the organi played in the 
USSR, and is even proud of having served in them: his only reason for his resignation was a 
purely pragmatic one, the uncertainty about his future. Furthermore, he first worked in politics 
beside Sobchak, whose authoritarian style—even if he was compromised with the opposition 
to the Soviet regime—seems to have been adopted by Putin on his relations to the independent 
media and opposition.  
These contradicting features can explain the confusion that still persists among the 
analysts, who have produced a wide range of interpretations of Putin’s ideology and political 
project. Five of them—“Yeltsin’s Heir”, “Neo-Authoritarian”, “Nostalgic for the Great 
Power”, “Pro-Western Reformer”, and “Pragmatic”—, together with the evolution of his 
career from 1996, will be discussed in the next part of this article.  
6.Bibliography 
 
Documents and reference books: 
• Biografiya / Biography [Russian and English versions], in 
http://www.president.kremlin.ru.  
• Ministerstvo Oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Institut Voyennoy Istorii (2002): “Putin, 
Vladimir Vladimirovich”, in Voyenniy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar [Military 
Encyclopaedic Dictionary]. Moscow, Bolshaya Rossiyskaya Entsiklopediya / Ripol 
Klassik.  
 
Books and chapters:  
• Andrew, Christopher and Gordievsky, Oleg (1991): KGB: The Inside Story of its 
Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev. London, Hodder & Stoughton.  
• Gevorkian, Natalia; Timakova, Natalia y Kolesnikov, Andrei (2000): Ot piervogo litsá: 
razgovori s Vladimirom Putinim [In the First Person: Talks with Vladimir Putin]. 
Moscow, Vagrius.  
• Mlechin, Leonid M. (2002): Kreml. Prezidenti Rossii: Strategia Vlasti ot B. N. Yeltsina 
do V. V. Putina [Kremlin. Presidents of Russia: Power’s Strategy from B. N. Yeltsin to 
V. V. Putin]. Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf.  
 10
• Poch-de-Feliu, Rafael (2003): La gran transición: Rusia, 1985-2002 [The Great 
Transition: Russia, 1985-2002]. Barcelona, Crítica.  
 UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS                                      Octubre de 2003 
 11
• Selezniov, Georgii K. (2001): “Rossiya pri Putine: nachalo novoy epokhi? (yanvar 
2000—iyun 2001 gg.)” [Russia in the Time of Putin: The Start of a New Era? (January 
2000-June 2001)], in Politicheskaya istoriya sovremenoy Rossii: 1991-2001 [Political 
History of Contemporary Russia: 1991-2001]. Moscow, Gumanitarniy Izdatielskiy 
Tsentr VLADOS, pp. 192-269.  
• Taibo, Carlos (2000): La explosión soviética [The Soviet explosion]. Madrid, Espasa 
Calpe.  
• Waller, J. Michael (1994): Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today. Boulder, 
Westview Press.  
 
Articles: 
• Belin, Laura: “Humor of the Political Opposition: Then and Now”, RFE/RL Russian 
Political Weekly, Vol. 2, No. 36, 30 October 2002, in http://www.rferl.org.  
• Bennet, Gordon (2002): Vladimir Putin and Russia’s Special Services, in 
http://www.csrc.ac.uk. 
• Fundació CIDOB (2001): Biografías de líderes políticos CIDOB: Vladimir Putin 
[CIDOB Political Leaders’ Biographies: Vladimir Putin], in http://www.cidob.org. 
• Morales Hernández, Javier: “Los Servicios de Seguridad e Inteligencia en la Rusia de 
Putin” [Security and Intelligence Services in Putin’s Russia], UNISCI Discussion 
Papers, No. 2 (May 2003), in http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci. 
 
